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INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2006, the South Asian Free Trade Area ("SAFTA")
agreement, negotiated between the seven members of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ("SAARC"), entered
into force.1 The treaty is extremely significant as it aims to promote
economic cooperation by increasing intra-regional trade between the
1. See Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area art. 22, Jan. 6, 2004,
http://www.saarc-sec.org/data/agenda/economic/safta/SAFTA%20AGREEMENT
.pdf [hereinafter SAFTA Agreement] (providing conditions for SAFTA's entry
into force on January 1, 2006). The seven contracting member states are: "the
People's Republic of Bangladesh, the Kingdom of Bhutan, the Republic of India,
the Republic of Maldives, the Kingdom of Nepal, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka." Id. pmbl. Among these,
Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and the Maldives are designated "least developed
countries." U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], The Least
Developed Countries Report 2006: Developing Productive Capacities, iii, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2006 (2006), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2006-en.pdf (classifying least developed
countries as such according to economic factors, health and literacy rates, and
other development indicators). Designation as a "least developed country" entitles
the country to receive "special and more favorable treatment" with respect to anti-
dumping, countervailing duties, and quantitative and import restrictions. SAFTA
Agreement, supra, arts. 1, 11.
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member countries, and making the South Asian region more
conducive to the receipt of foreign direct investment.2 In addition,
recognizing the long-standing border dispute between the two most
prominent member countries, India and Pakistan, the treaty is a
major effort toward facilitating improved socio-cultural and political
relations in the subcontinent through improved economic ties.'
The precursor to the SAFTA agreement, the SAARC Preferential
Trading Arrangement ("SAPTA"), entered into force on December 7,
1995.' The drafters of the SAPTA envisioned that it would not only
provide a foundation to develop the SAFTA agreement, but that
these instruments would ultimately result in the creation of other
institutional forums, such as a "Customs Union" and "Common
Market" and eventually a South Asian "Economic Union."5 The
2. See WORLD BANK GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2005: TRADE,
REGIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT 42 (2005), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2005/Resources/gep2005.pdf
[hereinafter WORLD BANK GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS] (indicating that under
SAFTA, approximately three-quarters of trade between the SAARC countries
would occur on a "preferential basis"); see also SAFTA to Help Attract More
Investment to South Asia, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 9, 2004, at 17, available at
http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/01/09/d40109050154.htm (emphasizing that
SAFTA will facilitate economic cooperation, rather than competition, between the
region's countries, promote domestic reform, and draw foreign direct investment to
one of the world's highly populated and economically attractive markets).
3. See WORLD BANK GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 2, at 36-38
(explaining that regional trade agreements, such as the SAFTA agreement, could
alleviate conflict between countries by creating institutional mechanisms and
opportunities to discuss and resolve disputes); see also Afshan Subohi, What Will
SAFTA Mean to Pakistan?, DAWN (Pak.), Mar. 21, 2004, Business, at 10, available
at http://www.dawn.com/2004/03/21/ebr8.htm (asserting that the opportunities
presented by the SAFTA agreement will continue to diminish Pakistan's concerns
about "Indian economic supremacy" in the region, as Pakistanis are already
beginning to retain their financial gains-rather than sending them abroad-
demonstrating increasing confidence in their own economy).
4. Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement, April 11, 1993,
http://www.saarc-sec.org/download.php?id=6 [hereinafter SAPTA]; SAFTA
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 22(1) (stating that after its entry into force, the
SAFTA agreement "shall supercede the [SAPTA]").
5. See South Asian Free Trade Area, http://www.saarc-
sec.org/main.php?t=2.1.6 (last visited Nov. 4, 2006); see also M. Aftab, Can
SAFTA Lead to a South Asian Economic Union?, DAWN (Pak.), Jan. 19, 2004, at 5,
available at http://www.dawn.com/2004/01/19/ebr8.htm (discussing the benefits
and drawbacks of SAFTA, which may result in the creation of an economic union
in the South Asian region).
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development of the SAFTA agreement is also consistent with the
ideologies of other developing nations to further the notion of
"south-south" trade cooperation, in an attempt to create a more
prosperous and favorable position in the global economy.6
However, to capitalize on the benefits of free trade agreements, it
is fundamental that all mechanisms under a treaty function
effectively, especially the dispute settlement mechanism.7 With the
successful implementation of the SAFTA agreement, larger members
like India and Pakistan certainly stand to benefit.8 In addition,
smaller countries, including Nepal and Bangladesh, also have an
important economic and political stake from a freer trade regime.9
This article argues that without certain key modifications to the
dispute settlement mechanism, the desired interests and benefits of
the SAFTA agreement remain illusory. 10 Part I of this article
6. See Looking South, North or Both?, EcONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.economist.com!world/la/displayStory.cfn?storyid=2409653&no na_
tran=l (tracking the promotion of "south-south" trade by Brazil, India, and others
as a means of boosting economic prosperity and moving closer to United Nations
Security Council membership).
7. See Nisha Taneja, Informal and Free Trade Arrangements, S. ASIAN J.,
Apr.-June 2004, available at
http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Joumal/informal-freetrade.htm
(explaining the importance of "institutional mechanisms" in formal trading
systems, which enable information sharing and reduce the uncertainties of
governmental and other regulatory policies and procedures).
8. See Decks Cleared, SAFTA Rings In, INDIAN EXPRESS, Dec. 2, 2005,
available at http://www.indianexpress.com/full-story.php?content -id=83097
(analyzing the potential for Indian trade to "gain significantly" from SAFTA and
forecasting the doubling of intra-regional trade between the SAARC countries);
Mubarak Zeb Khan, Shaukat Sounds Optimistic, DAWN (Pak.), Mar. 21, 2004,
available at http://www.dawn.com/2004/03/21/ebr9.htm (explaining SAFTA's
potential to improve Pakistan's economic position in the region by attracting more
foreign direct investment and reducing the volume of unofficial trade).
9. See Khadga Singh, What After SAFTA?, NEPALI TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at 8
(on file with author) (predicting widespread consumer benefits for Nepal while
conditioning Nepal's commercial success on comprehensive identification of
advantageous commodities). But see Benefits From Regional Trade Liberalization
Stressed, INDEPENDENT (Bangl.), Dec. 10, 2004, available at http://independent-
bangladesh.com/news/dec/10/10122004ts.htm (questioning whether the effect of
trade diversion-the increase of trade with member states at the expense of trade
with nonmember states-provided a net benefit or net loss to Bangladesh).
10. See discussion infra Part I; see also Myung Hoon Choo, Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms of Regional Economic Arrangements and Their Effects on the World
Trade Organization, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 253, 254 (1999) (arguing that
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illustrates the lack of depth and specificity in the provisions of the
SAFTA agreement's dispute settlement mechanism. In analyzing the
mechanism, this article compares its provisions with those under the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") Free Trade Area
("AFTA") and its various agreements ("AFTA agreements"),"
including its most recent amendment, the Protocol on Enhanced
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ("ASEAN Protocol"). 2
Part II provides a critical analysis of the SAFTA agreement's
dispute settlement provisions by comparing and contrasting its scope
and jurisdiction, panel selection, procedures utilized in deliberating
and rendering recommendations, and the use of the appellate review
process, with that of the ASEAN Protocol. Part III proposes certain
recommendations in response to these lacunae, which, if
incorporated, could strengthen the SAFTA agreement's efficacy and
implementation in the coming years. 3 Finally, the article concludes
that although the SAFTA agreement's dispute settlement provisions
currently appear inadequate, they could nevertheless be amended to
be more detailed and comprehensive, to assist in the realization of
the Contracting States' objectives, while equally benefiting the
business community engaged in cross-border trade. 4
the achievement of "diverse policy objectives, i.e., trade liberalization or
environmental protection, as well as true harmonization among nations" is
contingent upon the dispute settlement mechanisms available under the particular
regional free trade agreement).
11. See Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Jan. 28, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 513,
amended by Protocol to Amend the Agreement on the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) for
the Elimination of Import Duties, Jan. 31, 2003, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/14184.htm; Framework Agreements on Enhancing
ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Jan. 28, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 506 amended by
Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic
Cooperation, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1081, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/12374.htm [hereinafter AFTA Agreements].
12. ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Nov. 29,
2004, http://www.aseansec.org/l6754.htm [hereinafter ASEAN Protocol].
13. See discussion infra Part III (recommending clarification of the scope of
the SAFTA agreement's dispute settlement mechanism by indicating specific
qualifications and working procedures for the members of the Committee of
Experts, and suggesting amendments to the appellate review process).
14. See Jeffrey A. Kaplan, ASEAN'S Rubicon: A Dispute Settlement
Mechanism for AFTA, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 147, 173 (1996) (emphasizing
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I. BACKGROUND
In analyzing the most effective types of dispute settlement
mechanisms in multilateral and regional free trade agreements,
scholars advocate different approaches. 5  Among these, the
"negotiation-based settlement" and the "rule-based approach" are
perhaps the two most commonly used methodologies. 6 Members of
free trade area agreements usually strive toward the latter approach,
as it provides a more impartial, fair, consistent, and unbiased
platform to efficiently resolve disputes between countries.17 The
ASEAN Protocol follows a more "rule-based" tradition, while the
SAFTA agreement's dispute settlement provisions require more
depth and elaboration to move toward this effective rule-based
system. 1
8
A. THE SAPTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
Article 20 of the SAPTA provided for amicable resolution
the importance of a "transparent, independent dispute resolution system" in the
context of implementing the AFTA agreements so as to infuse confidence in the
members of the private sector engaged in regional cross-border trade).
15. See generally Brett A. Albren, Note, The Continued Need for a Narrowly-
Tailored, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Future Free Trade
Agreements, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 85, 105-07 (1996) (comparing
relative efficacies of "rule-based" and "negotiation-based" dispute resolution
mechanisms).
16. See id. at 92 (explaining that the "negotiation-based settlement" approach
permits parties to conduct deliberations and reach shared solutions, while the "rule-
based" approach inherits much from the "arbitration/adjudication method of
dispute resolution," which "emphasizes and emulates the modern judicial system
of rules of law, precedent, and appeal procedures"). "Rule-based" approaches
benefit most from "agreed-upon rules and case precedent," which support more
stable and predictable dispute resolution. Id. at 105-06.
17. See id. at 105-06 (surveying dispute settlement mechanisms and arguing
that "rule-based" systems prevent national power imbalances from consistently
skewing the resolution of disputes in favor of the stronger state).
18. See Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General, ASEAN, The ASEAN Way
and the Rule of Law, Address at the International Law Conference on ASEAN
Legal Systems and Regional Integration (Sept. 3, 2001) available at
http://www.aseansec.org/newdata/asean-way.htm (stating that the ASEAN "rules-
based" system of "binding legal foundations" will assist the ASEAN nations to
achieve "economic integration" and improve their respective domestic legal
regimes).
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between the Contracting States in the event of a dispute. 9 If
amicable dispute resolution failed to produce the desired outcome,
either of the disputing parties could submit the matter to the
Committee of Participants ("Committee"), which would have 120
days from the date of submission to review the dispute and
recommend an appropriate solution. 20 However, the agreement did
not delineate specific procedures for the Committee to follow in its
review, leaving the review largely to the Committee's discretion.
Other ambiguous issues included the obligations of Contracting
States to refer their respective trade disputes exclusively to the
SAPTA, to conduct domestic independent investigations, or to seek
remedies under multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade
Organization ("WTO").22 A recent dumping dispute between India
and Bangladesh tested the broad scope of the SAPTA's jurisdiction,
and illustrated the flaws of the mechanism. 3
19. SAPTA, supra note 4, art. 20 (mandating amicable resolution without
reference to negotiation, mediation, or other specific means of settlement).
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Ranabir R. Choudhury, Row Over Battery Imports, HINDU
BUSINESS LINE (India), Feb. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/02/16/stories/2004021600080800.htm
(discussing the hierarchy of dispute resolution mechanisms in disputes involving
potential SAPTA and WTO obligations).
23. See Monjur Mahmud, India Finally to Impose Anti-Dumping Duty, DAILY
STAR (Bangl.), Dec. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.thedailystar.net/dailystamews/200112/15/nI 121501.htm#BODY4
(describing Bangladesh's surprise and confusion in reaction to Indian anti-
dumping investigations and unilateral imposition of a new anti-dumping duty on
Bangladeshi imports, without reference to WTO or SAPTA dispute resolution
mechanisms). The dispute arose when Indian authorities imposed anti-dumping
duties and rescinded preferential trading treatment to Bangladesh because the
imports of lead acid batteries from Bangladesh into India were above the WTO's
"de minimis level" and allegedly caused "material injury" to the Indian industry.
Choudhury, supra note 22. To resolve the matter, the Bangladeshi Commerce
Minister, Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury first sought cooperation from the
Indian government and urged Indian officials to utilize. dispute settlement
procedures under SAPTA. Id. The Commerce Secretary stated that "we were
expecting some positive gestures from India but they have given a totally wrong
signal" which compelled Bangladesh to approach the WTO to utilize its dispute
resolution process. Id.
2007] 339
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B. THE SAFTA AGREEMENT'S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISM
Following the SAPTA, Article 10 of the SAFTA agreement
provides the dispute resolution framework available to Contracting
States by establishing a Committee of Experts ("COE") as its
primary dispute settlement body.24 Article 10 further establishes the
SAFTA Ministerial Council ("SMC"), which is the highest
administrative body concerned with implementation of the
agreement.25 Similar to the SAPTA, Article 20 of the SAFTA
agreement stipulates the dispute settlement mechanism for disputes
arising from the "interpretation or application" of the agreement and
its related instruments.26 In laying out the scope and framework for
the adjudication of disputes, the SAFTA agreement includes
provisions relating to consultations, timely COE review of a dispute,
and the procedures for seeking appellate review of a decision by the
SMC. 27
C. THE AFTA AGREEMENTS' DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISMS
In the initial 1992 Framework Agreement establishing the AFTA,
the dispute settlement provision in Article 9 provided for the
amicable resolution of disputes between the parties.28 It also
24. SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(5)-(7) (requiring that the COE
consist of one "Senior Economic Official" from each Contracting State with
"expertise in trade matters," but not requiring specific qualifications or
appointment procedures).
25. See id. art. 10(1)-(5) (stipulating that the "Ministers of Commerce/Trade"
from each member country will act as the SMC).
26. See id. art. 20(1).
27. See id. art. 20 (providing timeframes for initiating consultations,
conducting investigations, rendering recommendations, and seeking appellate
review of decisions); Mechanism to Settle Dispute Worked Out: SAFTA Treaty,
DAWN (PAK.), Jan. 7, 2004, available at
http://www.dawn.com/2004/01/07/ebr3.htm (explaining the various substantive
provisions available to parties under the SAFTA agreement, such as the procedures
for requesting the COE to examine a dispute, and timelines for the COE to render
its recommendations).
28. See AFTA Agreements, supra note 11, art. 9, 31 I.L.M. at 511; cf Deborah
A. Haas, Comment, Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater
Regional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POLY 809, 838-40 (1994) (criticizing the lack of guidance in Article 9).
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mentioned the possibility of setting up an ad hoc body to oversee the
settlement of disputes, but did not address any other rules or
procedures for dispute resolution 9.2 A few years later, acknowledging
the inadequacy of this provision, the ASEAN Ministers adopted a
Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism ("DSM") to implement
the AFTA agreements. 30 Most recently at the 1 0 1h ASEAN Summit
held in 2004, the ASEAN Protocol superseded the DSM and further
detailed the dispute settlement mechanism available to parties under
the AFTA and other agreements. 3'
Pursuant to the ASEAN Protocol, all disputes arising under the
existing and future AFTA agreements are within the purview of the
mechanism. 32 The Senior Economic Officials Meeting ("SEOM")
and the ASEAN Secretariat are the primary bodies that oversee the
dispute settlement process.33 After exhausting alternative dispute
settlement methods, namely consultations, good offices, conciliation,
and mediation, the parties may refer their disputes to the SEOM to
set up panels as well as review, implement, and monitor the
decisions regarding the breach of a party's obligations under the
agreement. 34 The ASEAN Protocol also provides more extensive
provisions on the role and functioning of the panels, timelines for
deliberation and rendering recommendations, a comprehensive
appellate review process administered by the ASEAN Economic
29. See AFTA Agreements, supra note 11, art. 9 31 I.L.M. at 511 (requiring,
where possible, the amicable resolution of disputes before designation of an
outside settlement body).
30. Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism pmbl., Nov. 20, 1996,
http://www.aseansec.org/l6654.htm [hereinafter DSM].
31. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 21 (preserving the DSM for all
disputes arising before November 29, 2004); see also Prime Minister Lt-Gen Soe
Win Attends l0th ASEAN Summits of Heads of State/Government of ASEAN and
Japan, ROK, India and Australia-New Zealand, NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR
(Myan.), Dec. 4, 2004, available at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/NLM2004-12-
04.pdf (reporting the signing of the ASEAN Protocol by the Economic Ministers at
the 10"h ASEAN Summit).
32. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 1 (preserving the application of
"special or additional rules" present in covered agreements).
33. See id. arts. 2, 19 (specifying the responsibility of the SEOM and the
ASEAN Secretariat to monitor and assist with the implementation of the ASEAN
Protocol).
34. See id. arts. 2-9.
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Ministers ("AEM"), and procedures for compensation and
suspension of concessions.35
II. ANALYSIS
Although the SAFTA agreement's dispute settlement mechanism
is a significant improvement over the SAPTA, it is still too
ambiguous and imprecise to meet the dispute resolution needs of the
seven member states.36 There are several lacunae not addressed by
the mechanism.37 One problem is the ambiguity in the scope and
jurisdiction of the SAFTA agreement, which could be a major
threshold issue in determining when and what disputes member
countries could refer for resolution. 3 Another obstacle is the lack of
procedures for the operation of the COE, as well as the largely
undefined qualifications of its members.39 In addition, the appellate
review process is also deficient, namely in the lack of scope and the
procedure for review of the legal versus substantive matters already
examined by the COE.4" Still more issues are left open-ended but are
not within the scope of this article include: the enforcement of
decisions, procedures for withdrawing and reinstating concessions,
and the catch-all provision allowing Contracting States to opt-out of
the SAFTA agreement at any time, without due cause or penalty.4'
35. See id. arts. 5-9, 12-16 (providing elaborate guidelines for the
establishment of panels, the terms of reference, procedures for deliberation and
rendering findings, as well as the composition and role of the appellate review
body in examining panel reports).
36. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20 (lacking depth and specificity
on jurisdiction, working procedures for the COE, and other key areas).
37. Compare id. art. 20 (failing to provide specific measures for the settlement
of disputes), with ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, arts. 1-2, 5-9, 11-15 (detailing
the mechanism's dispute settlement provisions to assure Member States the
availability of a well drafted, comprehensive, and objective dispute settlement
mechanism).
38. See discussion supra note 26 (outlining the jurisdiction of the SAFTA
agreement's dispute settlement mechanism); discussion infra Part II.A.
39. See discussion supra note 24 (discussing the member composition of the
COE); discussion infra Part II.B-C.
40. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20(9) (failing to address the
scope and extent of the SMC appellate review process); discussion infra Part II.D.
41. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20(11) (providing for the
withdrawal of concessions but not indicating any specific timeline for the
withdrawal or possibilities of reinstatement at a later stage if the violating party
remedies its behavior); id. art. 21 (allowing unilateral withdrawal and termination
342 [22:333
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In order for the SAFTA agreement's dispute settlement
mechanism to move toward a more "rule-based" system with specific
guidelines and procedures to adjudicate disputes, certain key areas of
the mechanism require reassessment.42 These areas include: the
agreement's jurisdiction, the qualifications and selection of the COE
members, the working procedures and terms of reference for the
functioning of the COE, and finally, the appellate review process
available to Contracting States under the agreement.43 By amending
these and other provisions, the Contracting States will benefit from a
stronger, rule-based process while maintaining flexibility and
discretion in the adjudication of disputes, thereby facilitating the
achievement of the SAFTA agreement's desired objectives.
A. THE SAFTA AGREEMENT DOES NOT DELINEATE THE SCOPE
AND JURISDICTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
A primary concern is whether the SAFTA agreement's dispute
settlement mechanism will be the sole and exclusive basis for
remedying violations of the agreement, or whether Contracting
States can simultaneously approach multilateral organizations, such
as the WTO, to resolve trade-related disputes, utilizing concurrent
jurisdiction.44 Additionally, the agreement does not discuss instances
of violations of the SAFTA agreement and its Contracting States'
obligations under the WTO, giving rise to multiple claims under both
mechanisms.45 Like disputes that arose under the SAPTA, the
of all SAFTA obligations six months after written notice is provided to the
SAARC Secretary-General). This broadly written provision permits Contracting
States to opt out of the agreement without providing any reason, thereby shirking
otherwise binding obligations, including those resulting from noncompliance with
unfavorable COE/SMC decisions. See id. art. 21(2).
42. See supra notes 15-18 (discussing why "rule-based" systems are preferred
for dispute settlement mechanisms); discussion infra Part II.A-D.
43. See discussion infra Part II.
44. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20(1) (requiring disputing parties
to initiate the consultation process without reference to simultaneous proceedings
in other fora); see also Choudhury, supra note 22 (describing the debate over the
need to exhaust SAPTA's dispute settlement mechanisms before resorting to WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") procedures).
45. See, e.g., Kyung Kwak & Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps & Conflicts of
Jurisdiction Between the WTO and RTAs, 2-12 (Apr. 26, 2002),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/sem-april02_e/marceau.pdf
(explaining the potential for overlapping jurisdiction of WTO and regional trade
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
SAFTA agreement's mechanism also fails to provide clarity on the
parties' obligation to seek assistance solely through its mechanism or
whether unilateral action based on a country's internal assessment of
a violation would be acceptable.46
Unlike the SAFTA agreement, the ASEAN Protocol provides
jurisdictional flexibility in its dispute resolution mechanism. 7
Addressing the potential jurisdictional problems that may arise in the
context of regional free trade agreements, the ASEAN Protocol
clearly stipulates that prior to initiating formal measures under the
ASEAN Protocol, its Member States can use any other dispute
settlement forum that they consider appropriate. 48 The provision
allows parties to use either the WTO or other forums for dispute
settlement, while simultaneously being able to request consultations
with fellow countries or use good offices, as well as other alternative
dispute settlement procedures to resolve their disputes. 49 Allowing
recourse to such an array of alternative mechanisms beyond the
SAFTA agreement could be especially beneficial to the smaller
member countries, such as Nepal, as it would avoid any unfair power
dynamics and domination by the larger Contracting States like India
and Pakistan. 0
agreement dispute mechanisms, and suggesting solutions drawn from doctrines of
private international law); see also Jeffrey A. Kaplan, ASEAN'S Rubicon: A
Dispute Settlement Mechanism for AFTA, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 147, 178-80
(1996) (encouraging states facing disputes concerning both WTO and AFTA
obligations to utilize ATFA's "dispute avoidance" mechanism before resorting to
the more drastic WTO dispute settlement mechanisms).
46. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing India's
controversial retaliation against Bangladesh without resort to relevant WTO and
SAPTA dispute mechanisms).
47. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 1(3).
48. See id. (allowing Member States to "resort to other fora at any stage before
a party has made a request to ... establish a panel").
49. See id. arts. 1(3), 3, 4 (permitting ASEAN Member States to use a variety
of internal and external dispute settlement mechanisms as an alternative to formal
panel-based proceedings).
50. See Is SAFTA a Non-Starter?, KATHMANDU POST (Nepal), Jan. 10, 2003,
available at http://www.nepalnews.com/
contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2003/jan/jan10/featuresl.htm (arguing that just as
there is a power imbalance between the North American Free Trade Area
agreement member countries, Canada and Mexico compared to the United States,
the same holds true in the South Asian context where the "relative economic
strengths" of countries like India and Pakistan would enable them to assert
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Further, given the political, socio-economic, cultural, and religious
differences between the Contracting States, recourse to good offices,
mediation, and other means involving non-South Asian countries
could assist greatly in alleviating tensions and arriving at a neutral
settlement.51 However, despite the example of the ASEAN Protocol,
the SAFTA agreement merely perpetuates the jurisdictional flaws
that existed under the SAPTA.52 In doing so, the SAFTA agreement
leaves the Contracting States vulnerable in the early stages of a
dispute. 3
Another problematic issue is that the SAFTA agreement is silent
about situations where the actions or domestic law of a particular
Contracting State-while not violative of the SAFTA agreement-
may nevertheless inadvertently contradict or nullify the purposes of
the agreement.54 Although allowing such disputes to fall under the
SAFTA agreement could hamper the ability of individual
governments to enact domestic legislation in accordance with their
internal policy objectives, the burden still remains on the Contracting
States to make a good faith effort to maintain the objectives of the
SAFTA agreement.55 Cognizant of this issue, the ASEAN Protocol
authority over the smaller countries, such as the Maldives and Nepal).
51. See S. N. Al Habsy & Kishor Uprety, Cooperation for Nominal
Development or Politics for Actual Survival? South Asia in the Making of
International Law, 12 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 19, 20-30 (2002)
(studying the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ("SAARC") as a
means of overcoming the threats to stability rooted in the region's "diversity in
[their] economic and military power" and "mutual suspicion and distrust"); see
also Nirvikar Singh, The Idea of South Asia and the Role of the Middle Class 1-5
(University of California Santa Cruz, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 597, 2005),
http://econ.ucsc.edu/faculty/workingpapers/ldeaofSouthAsiaApril2005.pdf
(arguing that the development of SAARC institutions reflects the region's
evolution from colonial British roots to a new economic and social identity).
52. See Abid Qaiyum Suleri & Bhaskar Sharma, Op-Ed, The SAFTA Mirage,
HIMAL SOUTHASIAN (Nepal), Feb. 2004, available at
http://www.himalmag.com/2004/february/opinion-3.htm (critiquing the SAFTA
agreement for not improving on other "gray areas," such as "rules of origin").
Compare SAPTA, supra note 4, art. 20, and supra Part L.A (analyzing SAPTA's
dispute settlement mechanism), with SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20, and
supra Part II.A (analyzing SAFTA's dispute settlement mechanism).
53. See Suleri & Sharma, supra note 54.
54. See Kaplan, supra note 45, at 175-76 (emphasizing the importance of
hearing "non-violation" claims addressing "actions not explicitly covered .. but
which severely undermine" intended trade regime benefits).
55. See id. (arguing that the acceptance of "non-violation" claims in dispute
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stipulates that if a Member State adversely affects the rights of a
fellow Member State under the AFTA and its covered agreements,
the Member State can offer suggestions to the suspected violating
state to change its detrimental action.1
6
B. THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COE ARE NOT
ADEQUATELY SPECIFIED IN THE SAFTA AGREEMENT
Under the SAFTA agreement, in the event that Contracting States
are unable to amicably resolve their disputes under the consultative
and other mechanisms, the COE acts as the primary dispute
settlement body. 7 As presently drafted, the SAFTA agreement does
not provide any guidelines for the selection of the members of the
COE in terms of their qualifications, age, or years of expertise in the
area of trade law, policy, or economics either in the domestic or
international arena. The lack of specific expertise could impede the
COE's ability to function independently and effectively since
political appointments in the South Asian region are often fraught
with corruption. 9 Further, the fact that the members of the COB are
settlement mechanisms necessarily requires sacrifices in municipal governance). A
model provision suggested for AFTA which could also be applicable to the
SAFTA agreement is as follows:
The dispute settlement procedures of this Agreement shall apply with respect
to any dispute between persons, as defined in this Agreement, regarding the
interpretation or application of an AFTA agreement or where a person
considers that a measure of an AFTA signatory is or will be inconsistent with
AFTA obligations or cause a nullification or impairment of a benefit created
by AFTA.
Id. at 176.
56. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 3(2) (allowing Member States
affected by violations of the act to make "representations or proposals" to other
states, who must give the communications "due consideration").
57. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 10(7), 20(2)-20(7) (requiring
resort to the COE in cases where a request for consultation is ignored, or in cases
where consultations take place, but both states recognize that they have failed).
58. See id. art. 10(5) (requiring only that COE members hold "Senior
Economic Official" positions and have "expertise in trade matters").
59. See id. See generally Salahuddin Aminuzzaman, A Regional Overview
Report on National Integrity Systems in South Asia, (produced for Transparency
International South Asia Regional Workshop on National Integrity Systems,
Karachi, Pakistan, Dec. 18-20, 2004), available at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/ 1718/8609 (discussing the
"systemic corruption" that pervades most of the South Asian economies, and the
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political appointees leaves them vulnerable to political or economic
pressures, which have a tendency to prevent high-ranking
government officials from rendering unbiased decisions involving
vital trade matters.6°
The use of specific qualifications such as a minimum number of
years in the civil service, publication in the field of trade law, policy
or related fields, and academic or consulting experience at a regional
or international level could help diminish allegations of corruption
among the COE's members. 6' An additional problem is that the
SAFTA agreement excludes experts from the non-governmental or
private sectors, namely scholars, academicians, and private
practitioners engaged in cross-border transactions, from providing
useful expertise in a dispute between the Contracting States.62
Allowing the participation of such individuals would not only reduce
fears of bias or pressures inherent in the political nature of the COE's
appointees, but would also add valuable depth and knowledge to the
interpretation and application of the SAFTA agreement in each
specific dispute.63
Although the COE may solicit the assistance of a "specialist" from
a Contracting State to provide "peer review of the matter referred to
it," the SAFTA agreement is yet again silent on the qualifications or
selection procedure for these individuals. 64 Therefore, the same
general lack of skilled and adequately qualified personnel within the national
administrative and political divisions).
60. Compare SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(5) (stating that the COE
will be comprised of "Senior Economic Official[s]" but not indicating whether
they would be expected to act in their governmental capacity or neutrally), with
ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, app. II(I)(9) (requiring panelists to "serve in their
individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as representatives
of any organization" to avoid any political or other undue influence).
61. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, app. 11(l) (establishing specific
selection criteria relating to "the independence of the members, a sufficiently
diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience").
62. See, e.g., SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(5) (allowing only
government officials to be members of the COE).
63. See, e.g., David Livshiz, Note, Public Participation in Disputes Under
Regional Trade Agreements: How Much is Too Much-The Case for a Limited
Right of Intervention, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 529, 550-51 (2005) (touting
regional agreements like the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, that require
specific qualifications of panelists and specialization in specific areas of law).
64. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20(8) (permitting the COE to
establish a panel of eligible specialists for "peer review" purposes).
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concerns previously discussed pertaining to the COE members'
qualifications and political bias also apply to the "specialist" in the
adjudication of disputes.6 1
In comparison, the ASEAN Protocol has elaborate and detailed
criteria for the composition of the panels, and these safeguards
diminish fears of bias or inability of the individual panelists to
effectively adjudicate disputes.66 For instance, the ASEAN Protocol
allows for the appointment of "non-governmental" personnel with
specific experience either within the ASEAN institutional framework
or within other reputable organizations, thereby adding diversity and
depth to the panelists.67 Moreover, it specifies other criteria such as
publication, teaching, and professional experience, not only in
international trade or law, but also in other fields encompassed by the
AFTA agreements. 68 Having access to such a wide array of
individuals allows Member States to take advantage of the specific
knowledge and expertise required for the resolution of the parties'
specific disputes.69 Such detailed provisions ensure the neutral and
65. See id. (remaining silent on the "specialist's" political affiliations or depth
of expertise on a particular subject matter); see, e.g., Livshiz, supra note 63, at
550-51 (noting that the use of panelists with expertise in labor, environment, and
other specialized subject matters reduces the appearance of a trade regime's
relative bias for commercial interests).
66. Compare SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(5) (discussing the
establishment of the COE from "nominee[s]" of the Contracting States) and
SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20(8) (providing for the inclusion of a
"specialist from a Contracting State not party to the [particular] dispute"), with
ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 8(1) (noting that the panels have the
independence to determine their own procedures, apart from following the
prescribed guidelines in Appendix II) and ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, app.
II(I)(l)-(9) (detailing the qualifications, expertise, and background of the members
of the panels under the ASEAN Protocol).
67. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, app. II(I)(1) (allowing the panels to
be comprised of those "who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served
in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or
served as a senior trade policy official of a Member State").
68. See id. app. II(I)(4) ("Members may periodically suggest names of
governmental and non-governmental individuals for inclusion on the indicative
list, providing relevant information on their knowledge of international trade and
of the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements."). The ASEAN Protocol
additionally states that the lists of panelists "shall indicate specific areas of
experience or expertise of the individuals in the sectors or subject matter of the
covered agreements." Id.
69. See id. app. II(I)(2) (noting that the selection of the panelists in accordance
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effective functioning of the panels, and would be an invaluable
addition to the SAFTA agreement's text.7 °
C. THE WORKING PROCEDURES FOR THE COE IN THE SAFTA
AGREEMENT ARE LEFT LARGELY TO THE COE's DISCRETION
While outlining the timeframe within which the COE must
investigate a dispute and render its recommendations to the
Contracting States involved, the SAFTA agreement is silent on the
procedures, rules, and nature of such deliberations. 7' Accordingly,
without further guidance, the SAFTA agreement would allow the
COE broad discretion to utilize any processes or methods it deems fit
to examine a dispute and make recommendations .7  The lack of
specific terms of reference could significantly hamper the ability of
the COE to engage in fair and meaningful deliberations to arrive at
its conclusions.73
For instance, the SAFTA agreement does not indicate the
procedure or format for disputing parties to present evidence to the
COE, namely whether the evidence would be oral or written, whether
parties could bring in experts or witnesses to testify on their behalf,
or whether parties could rebut allegations.74 In contrast, the ASEAN
Protocol details the manner in which the panel receives written and
oral submissions from not only the disputing states but also from
interested third parties.75 Further, under the ASEAN Protocol, all
statements, rebuttals, and other information presented before the
with the procedures set forth in the ASEAN Protocol's appendix is aimed at
"ensuring the independence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and
a wide spectrum of experience").
70. See id.
7 1. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20(7) (requiring the COE to
conclude an investigation and make a recommendation within sixty days, but not
establishing procedures for such investigation or deliberation).
72. See id. art. 10(10) (providing that the COE is free to use its "own rules of
procedure" without giving any guidelines, framework, or terms of reference).
73. See id.
74. See id. arts. 10(10), 20(7).
75. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, app. 11(11) (4)-(6) (stipulating the
procedures by which parties can present their written complaints including "the
facts of the case and their arguments" and responses to allegations, as well as the
manner in which third parties may attend and participate in the proceedings,
provided that they have informed the SEOM of "their interest in the dispute").
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panel are available to other parties and the public.76 Specifying such
procedures would allow the SAFTA agreement's Contracting States
room to present a wide array of evidence supporting their positions,
and facilitate more meaningful deliberation by the COE in making its
recommendations, which is critical to ensuring fairness within the
proceedings.77
Another related concern is that although the SAFTA agreement
allows for the participation of a "specialist" in the decision-making
process, it does not specify the nature and extent of this individual's
involvement.78 Given that the qualifications of the members of the
COE are relatively unclear, the use of a "specialist" could be
especially valuable to the COE in assessing complicated trade-related
disputes that may arise under the SAFTA agreement.79  In
comparison, the ASEAN Protocol acknowledges that panels could
benefit from expert opinions, and therefore allows its panels to
obtain information or guidance from any outside source, which the
panels can then consider in rendering decisions.8" Although neither
the ASEAN Protocol nor the SAFTA agreement provide guidance on
the role expert suggestions should play in the panel's decision-
making process, the ASEAN Protocol at least allows the panels to
obtain advice from any source believed to assist the panel's
determinations.81 Narrowing the COE's ability to gain assistance
only from a single "specialist," without further direction as to such
an individual's qualifications or role, would not substantially add
value to the proposed "peer review" process.
Moreover, unlike the ASEAN Protocol's emphasis on panels
performing "objective assessment" of the parties' obligations under
the AFTA agreements, the SAFTA agreement leaves room for the
76. See id. app. II(II)(3), (11) (permitting a Member State to publicly disclose
any information pertaining to its own involvement in a case as well as to request
"non-confidential [summaries]" of positions of other parties, and allowing parties
access to "presentations, rebuttals and statements").
77. See id. app. II(II).
78. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20(8).
79. See supra notes 66-67 (discussing the lack of qualifications or selection
criteria for the "specialist" in the SAFTA agreement).
80. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 8(4) (allowing a panel to obtain
"information and technical advice from any individual or body" that it believes
would be beneficial to the resolution of the dispute).
81. See id.
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COE's subjective interpretations.8 2  Requiring that the COE
impartially examine a dispute, at a minimum, diminishes concerns of
bias in the COE's recommendations.83 Thus, although both the
ASEAN Protocol and the SAFTA agreement give their respective
decision-making bodies discretion to utilize their own procedures,
the SAFTA agreement should embrace at least some of the ASEAN
Protocol's guidelines to mitigate the risks of leaving all the
procedures to the COE's discretion.
D. THE APPELLATE REVIEW PROCESS BY THE SMC UNDER THE
SAFTA AGREEMENT IS PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY
UNSATISFACTORY
Having a transparent and effective appellate review process is
critical to the functioning of any dispute settlement mechanism in a
free trade agreement.8 4 As with many of the other provisions
discussed, the appellate review mechanism under the SAFTA
agreement only provides a skeletal framework for the examination of
the COE's recommendations.85 The SAFTA agreement does little to
discuss the scope of the "review" in terms of factual matters, legal
82. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 7 (explaining that an "objective
assessment" encompasses "an examination of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the sections of the Agreement or any covered
agreements"). Compare SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(10) (leaving the
determination of the procedures of the COE to its own discretion), with ASEAN
Protocol, supra note 12, arts. 7, 8, app. II(II) (detailing the manner in which the
panels should undertake their examination of a dispute).
83. See generally Sree Kumar, Policy Issues and the Formation of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area, in AFTA: THE WAY AHEAD 71, 90-91 (Pearl Imada & Seiji
Naya eds., 1992) (emphasizing the need for members of regional trade agreements
to follow an "objective and unbiased" dispute settlement procedure without the
interference of their respective governments to achieve the full desired benefits of
free trade).
84. See Nobuo Kiriyama, Institutional Evolution in Economic Integration: A
Contribution to Comparative Institutional Analysis for International Economic
Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 53, 67-68 (1998) (emphasizing the role
of effective appellate review processes in ensuring predictability and the
confidence of the parties).
85. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20(9) (providing that the SMC
may "review" the COE's recommendations and either "uphold, modify or reverse"
them as the SMC deems appropriate, without any further mention of the scope or
basis of their reexamination of the dispute).
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substance, or the rules and nature of its proceedings.86 Moreover, the
process is vulnerable to internal biases and political differences. The
SMC, which is the body that conducts the review, is comprised only
of the "Ministers of Commerce/Trade" of the SAFTA member
countries, and its findings likely would remain confidential.87
In contrast, the ASEAN Protocol provides a far more detailed and
satisfactory mechanism for the review of the recommendations
rendered by the panels.88 At the outset, the ASEAN Protocol departs
from the largely inadequate model of its precursor, the DSM, in
which the AEM was the body that conducted the appellate review. 9
Instead, the ASEAN Protocol vests the AEM with the responsibility
of establishing an appellate review panel that is comprised of highly
competent and experienced individuals with specific qualifications.9"
Furthermore, the ASEAN Protocol expressly states that only the
legal issues involved in the panel's recommendation report are
subject to appeal, thereby clarifying the scope of the review. 9'
Although only the disputing parties involved may appeal a finding,
interested third parties also have the opportunity to present their
views.92
86. See id. arts. 10(10), 20(9) (stating that the SMC would be free to "adopt
[its] own rules of procedure" but not providing any other information regarding the
scope and nature of the SMC's review of the recommendations, or any terms of
reference for its functioning).
87. See id. art. 10(3), 20(9) (describing the composition of the SMC but not
clarifying whether its findings during the appellate review process would remain
confidential, or be available for public scrutiny).
88. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 12 (detailing the appellate review
process available to the parties).
89. See Kiriyama, supra note 84, at 67-68 (noting potential for undesirable
political intervention accompanying the use of the AEM as the "inter-
governmental body" for appeals under the former ASEAN dispute settlement
mechanism). Compare DSM, supra note 30, art. 8(1) (stating that the AEM is to
conduct the appellate review process), with ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art.
12(1) (improving the DSM model, and mandating the establishment of an appellate
three-person panel per case to review the panel's findings).
90. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 12(1)-(3) (enumerating the
qualifications for the panel members, including that they are prohibited from
having connections to a specific government, and cannot adjudicate a dispute
where there might be a potential "direct or indirect conflict of interest").
91. See id. art. 12(6) (only permitting appeals on "issues of law covered in the
panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel").
92. See id. art. 12(4) (stipulating that third parties who "have notified the
SEOM of a substantial interest in the matter" may present their views to the
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Thus, because the SAFTA agreement's dispute settlement
mechanism is still too imprecise to carry out its mission,
modifications that would significantly enhance the mechanism's
value, and infuse greater certainty into the dispute settlement process
are required.
IIJ.RECOMMENDATIONS
Recognizing certain key lacunae in the SAFTA agreement's
dispute settlement mechanism, this section proposes ways to improve
the mechanism's effectiveness. The suggestions include: clarifying
the mechanism's scope and jurisdiction, specifying the qualifications
and working procedures of the COE, and streamlining the appellate
review process. The implementation of these and other
recommendations could considerably strengthen the mechanism and
benefit the Contracting States.
A. STIPULATE THE MECHANISM'S SCOPE AND JURISDICTION
In addition to disputes arising from the SAFTA agreement, the
Contracting States should also allow parties to raise non-violation
claims of apparent or indirect conflicts between their domestic laws
and the SAFTA agreement.93 Such a measure could strengthen the
implementation of the SAFTA agreement, and also enable the
Contracting States to reap the intended benefits of free trade under
the agreement. 94 With regard to the jurisdiction of the dispute
settlement mechanism, the drafters of the SAFTA agreement could
follow the example of the ASEAN Protocol, which allows greater
appellate body); see also Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Three's a Crowd: Third
Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement 14-18 (Jan. 2006), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/users/mlb66/Third%20Parties%2OWorld%20Politics.
pdf (assessing WTO disputes and proposing that the influence of third parties may
not always be beneficial as their influence often reduces the amicable settlement of
disputes at early stages).
93. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1 (limiting the reach of the
dispute settlement mechanism only to cases that may arise under the SAFTA
agreement, but not providing for non-violation claims).
94. See Kaplan, supra note 45, at 175-76 (arguing that the ability to bring
"nullification and impairment claims" ensures the full enforcement of trade
benefits, and that the ability to bring "loss-of-benefits" claims deters more subtle
attempts to undermine the trade regime).
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flexibility to the parties in choosing an appropriate forum for dispute
settlement.95 In doing so, they could allow disputing Contracting
States access to any externally available fora or means of dispute
settlement prior to commencing formal proceedings under the
SAFTA agreement.96
Depending on the nature of the dispute, such means could include
access to the procedures available under the more advanced Dispute
Settlement Understanding ("DSU") of the WTO. 97 It could also
encompass the use of less formal alternatives such as mediation,
conciliation, or good offices to complement the existing consultation
proceedings available to parties under the SAFTA agreement.9"
Recently the Contracting States also signed an agreement to establish
a SAFTA Arbitration Council in an effort to improve the existing
dispute settlement framework. 99 While the details of the agreement
95. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 1 (allowing parties the flexibility
to use any dispute settlement mechanism outside the AFTA framework or to use
the procedures available under ASEAN Protocol).
96. See id. art. 1(3) (stating that parties "can resort to other fora at any stage
before a party has made a request" to begin formal panel proceedings).
97. See Choo, supra note 11, at 275-77 (explaining that, because international
trade actors depend on the stability of subsystems within systems, regional dispute
settlement mechanisms should be fluid and able to complement the dispute
mechanisms of larger frameworks like the WTO). But while immediate access to
WTO dispute settlement mechanisms might save regional mechanism resources,
the ability to bring claims in multiple forums risks producing an unpredictable and
divergent jurisprudence. See Sydney M. Cone, III, The Promotion of Free-Trade
Areas Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and "Imperial
Preference," 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 563, 580-83 (2005) (analyzing the interaction of
regional and WTO dispute settlement mechanisms, and predicting the emergence
of abstention doctrines to address overlapping proceedings).
98. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, art. 4 (permitting parties to utilize
"good offices, conciliation or mediation" as alternatives to establishing panels
under the ASEAN Protocol).
99. Agreement for Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council, Nov. 13,
2005 available at
http://www.mofa.gov.bd/13saarcsummit!Agreement%20on%20%20SAARC%20A
rbitration%20Council%20final.pdf, SAARC Pact on Avoidance of Double
Taxation, TRIBUNE (India), Nov. 13, 2005, available at
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20051114/world.htm#2 (reporting that the
Indian Prime Minister called the arbitration agreement a "forward-looking
document" to boost free trade). Recent criticisms of the negative effects of the
AFTA agreements on local manufacturers in the ASEAN countries also prompted
the establishment of the "ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment
Issues (ACT) and the ASEAN Compliance Board (ACB)" which, among other
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have not been revealed, such a mechanism could be vital in
supplementing the dispute settlement mechanism under the SAFTA
agreement. 00
B. IMPROVE THE QUALIFICATIONS AND COMPOSITION OF THE
COE
Another key area that requires modification in the SAFTA
agreement concerns the qualifications of the members of the COE.'0
In order to counteract the inherent political nature of the nominees,
the SAARC countries should consider appointing certain non-
governmental individuals with strong credentials and demonstrated
expertise in international trade, economics, and related fields to
provide a wide array of expertise to interpret the agreement's
provisions.1°2 Although the drafters of the SAFTA agreement most
likely intended the members of the COE to act in their independent
capacity and not as agents of their respective governments, the
agreement should nevertheless explicitly state this requirement to
ensure the fair and neutral functioning of the body. 03 Such measures
would be vital to alleviate concerns of corruption among the COE,
and ensure a fair and honest process for adjudicating disputes.0 4
things, provide "web-based advisory mechanism[s]" for the settlement of disputes.
Jessica B. Natad, ASEAN Free Trade Seen to Hurt Local Makers, SUN STAR
(Phil.), Oct. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/ceb/2005/10/11 /bus/asean. free.trade. seen.to.hurt.
local.makers..html. Id.
100. See Kaplan, supra note 45, at 182-87 (suggesting the importance of an
"expeditious, reliable, and transparent" arbitration process in the AFTA context,
and providing model provisions).
101. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(5); discussion supra Part II.B.
102. See, e.g., Livshiz, supra note 63, at 551 (noting that institutionalized
sophistication in panel membership tends to move systems away from the "flexible
arbitration model" towards a more stable tribunal model with the capacity to
develop interpretive expertise).
103. See id.; ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, app. II(I)(2), (9) (mandating that
panelists "serve in their individual capacities" and prohibiting Member State
"instructions" or "influence").
104. See generally Siddharth Srivastava, A Stinging Exposure of India's
Corrupt, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (H.K.), Dec. 23, 2005,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South Asia/GL23Df03.html (illustrating several
recent instances of the scandals and corruption that pervade India's political and
bureaucratic quarters). The South Asian plague of corruption, scams, and fraud
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C. DEVELOP COMPREHENSIVE WORKING PROCEDURES FOR THE
COE
The SAFTA agreement does not provide much guidance to the
COE for examining a dispute or rendering its recommendations.10 5
Following the example of the ASEAN Protocol, the SAFTA
agreement should provide the COE with an operating framework to
streamline the process and lessen ambiguity.106 First, it should permit
parties to submit both written documents and oral testimony, and
indicate the manner in which the COE should objectively review the
facts of the matter. 107 Second, interested third parties, namely other
Contracting States, should have the right to participate in the
proceedings and provide valuable insights and perspectives to assist
the COE with its determination of the case, and to protect their own
interests which might be affected by the outcome of the dispute.01
Third, affording parties the opportunity to disclose information about
the dispute to the public, including relevant documentation, or
allowing publication of the COE's recommendations after the
resolution of a dispute, would greatly enhance transparency. 10 9 Such
measures would provide interested actors, including private citizens,
academicians, and non-governmental organizations, with valuable
makes the COE institution even more vulnerable to quid pro quo bribery and
threats. Id.
105. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(10) (granting the SMC and
COE complete discretion to establish procedural rules); discussion supra Part II.C.
106. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, app. II(II) (providing a
comprehensive framework within which panels should operate while reviewing a
dispute).
107. See id. art. 7, app. 11(11) (4)-(5) (requiring the "objective assessment" of
disputes, and requiring the parties to submit documents and present their case
before the panels).
108. See Livshiz, supra note 63, at 581-82 (advocating a limited right of
participation for non-party stakeholders to be conditioned on the ability to protect
the stakeholders' interests while not hindering the functioning of the adjudicating
body). Legitimate interveners would be identified by evaluating "1) whether the
intervener has an adequate interest in the dispute, 2) whether the stakeholder's
interest is already adequately represented by the parties to the case and, 3) whether
the intervener has the ability to provide new and valuable information to the
tribunal." Id.
109. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, app. II(I)(3) (allowing Member
States to disclose information regarding the proceedings to the public in certain
circumstances). This would ensure openness while not detrimentally affecting the
rights of any of the parties involved in the dispute. Id.
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access to important information about the proceedings, and allow for
more meaningful debate and critique." I 0
D. REVISE THE APPELLATE REVIEW PROCESS
Finally, the appellate review process available to parties under the
SAFTA agreement is unsatisfactory and requires revision."' By
following the example of the ASEAN Protocol appellate review
process, for instance, the Contracting States likely could ensure the
reliability of the review, and benefit from fairly elaborate procedures
regarding the scope and process of the review." 2 The SAFTA
agreement should clearly indicate the scope of the review, preferably
limiting it to legal issues rather than substantive factual reviews.' '3 In
addition, as with the members of the COE, it would be prudent to
permit individuals from the non-governmental sector, including
academicians, scholars, and other reputed professionals with
specified credentials, to act as the .appellate body and thereby dispel
concerns of bias and unfairness."4 Finally, the drafters also should
consider making some form of the appellate body's decisions
available for public scrutiny.
110. See also Mustafa Zaman, When Hope Runs High: Expectations and
Realities from the Summit, STAR WEEKEND MAGAZINE (Bangl.), Nov. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2005/11/02/cover.htm
(reporting on the general skepticism of constituents about the relative effectiveness
of the SAPTA and SAFTA agreements).
11. See SAFTA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 20(9)-(l 1) (providing minimal
substantive guidance regarding the nature, scope, and procedure of the appellate
review process available to Contracting States); discussion supra Part I.D.
112. See ASEAN Protocol, supra note 12, arts. 12-14 (discussing the fairly
comprehensive appellate review process available under the ASEAN Protocol).
The mechanism details the scope of the review as well as the composition and
qualifications of the members of the appellate body established by the SEOM. Id.
Further, the provisions specify communications and submissions allowed to the
body, the nature and scope of the recommendations that the body may render, and
the suggested manner of implementation. Id.
113. See id. art. 12(6) ("An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in
the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.").
114. See id. art. 12(3) (mandating that individuals serving on the Appellate Body
should have highly regarded credentials, and should "be unaffiliated with any
government").
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CONCLUSION
Despite the long-standing differences between the SAARC
countries, the SAFTA agreement demonstrates the commitment of
these countries to improve economic and trade relations, thereby
laying a foundation for increased cooperation in other areas as
well. 15 But the agreement's framework is inadequate to realize its
goals. The member countries crafted a broad dispute settlement
mechanism with provisions subject to open interpretation, perhaps as
a last resort to reach a compromise during the agreement's incipient
phases." 6 The ambiguities of the dispute settlement mechanism may
have caused some countries to hesitate in accepting their obligations
under the agreement, as evidenced by some countries' delay in its
ratification. '17
To capitalize on the agreement's potential, the dispute settlement
mechanism requires more detailed provisions, particularly in its
scope, jurisdiction, appointment and working procedures of the
bodies rendering recommendations, and in its appellate review
115. See Alok Bansal, Strategic Comment, Troubled Road to SAFTA, INSTITUTE
FOR DEFENSE STUDIES AND ANALYSES, Mar. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/alokbansal 100305.htm (explaining
SAFTA's role in overcoming otherwise hostile and rather delicate relations
between the member countries); see also Bijan Lal Dev, Editorial, The Future of
Free Trade in South Asia, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Dec. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/12/09/d41209020429.htm (evaluating SAFTA in
the context of both the ASEAN trade structure, as well as other regional free trade
area agreements).
116. See, e.g., C. Uday Bhaskar, Strategic Comment, Dhaka SAARC Summit:
Political Compulsions Blunt Economic Progress, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES
AND ANALYSES, Dec. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/cudaybhaskar81205.htm
(lamenting the "structural constraints," stunted political discourse, and socio-
economic differences plaguing SAARC cooperative efforts); Badar Alam Iqbal,
South Asian Union: Distant Possibility, Urgent Necessity, SARID JOURNAL, 2005,
available at http://saridjoumal.org/2005/iqbal.htm (suggesting independent
bilateral trade agreements as solutions to the gaps caused by "a deficiency in
political will, institutional weakness and the lack of a financial mechanism" within
the SAARC framework).
117. See SAFTA Comes Into Effect, Pak Yet to Ratify SAFTA, DECCAN HERALD
(India), Jan. 2, 2006, available at
http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/jan22006/national 175458200611 .asp
(noting that Pakistan had not yet ratified the SAFTA agreement but that its
officials have indicated they would do so soon).
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process. 8 As one commentator notes, the SAFTA agreement at
present is akin to "announcing a marriage but deferring
consummation," since it lacks the defined dispute settlement and
other related provisions necessary for meaningful enforcement. 1 9 It
is therefore imperative for the Contracting States to strengthen the
dispute settlement and other mechanisms under the SAFTA
agreement by adding more detailed provisions or by adopting a
separate protocol or other instrument to enforce compliance. 20
118. See discussion infra Parts II-III. See generally Choo, supra note 11, at 254
(noting the importance of strong dispute settlement mechanisms to effective free
trade agreements).
119. See C. Raja Mohan, SAARC Does Not Chime as Summits Do Not Strike the
Right Time, GULF NEWS (U.A.E.), Jul. 2, 2005, available at
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/05/02/07/
150891.html (criticizing SAARC members for not reaching agreement on
complicated, yet key issues within the agreement such as "rules of origin, dispute
settlement, and compensation for least developed countries").
120. See Abid Qaiyum Suleri & Bhaskar Sharma, SAFTA: A Long Way to Turn
Dreams Into Realities, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT POLICY INSTITUTE RESEARCH
& NEWS BULLETIN, Jan.-Feb. 2004, available at
http://www.sdpi.org/help/research-andnewsbulletin/nbjanfeb04/articles/
SAFTA.htm (identifying other SAFTA areas in need of reform such as "trade in
services," "harmonization of custom(s) [and] banking," and "protection of
investment"); see also M. Shamsur Rahman, Implement SAFTA With Reciprocity
for Benefit of All, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Aug. 21, 2004, available at
http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/08/21/d4082101088.htm (reporting initiatives by
the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry and other professional
organizations to develop arbitration as a mechanism to implement the sought-after
benefits of the SAFTA agreement).
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